I’ll explain the mechanisms and effects of free market versions of various downturns and why they’ll still exist even in
Local, Non-System-Wide Busts
Imagine for a moment you’re living in a town that is a major lumber producer. Your town is a trade hub for logs for ship building and you also have a substantial manufacturing
This above scenario is not a hypothetical but what
The above scenario is a classic free market driven depression. But note that is is localized and limited. Towns and cities that have built up an economy around a narrow business sector are at high risk of such busts, which many may also call recessions and depressions. Capital deterioration and obsolescence eventually causes the businesses of an area to become less competitive over time when compared to businesses elsewhere.
Over time,
What Austrian-school economics identifies here, however, is that the above downturns tend to be amplified and exacerbated by government attempts to help. Stimulus efforts tend to be
Additionally, such a scenario is possible only if there’s a single dominant company or industry within a region. This is a common issue with small towns, but a diverse economy shouldn’t ever experience a large-scale disruption. A nation like Uzbekistan is at high risk of a free market recession since its economic output is dominated by gold mining, but a country like the United States, Japan or even Mexico should be entirely immune to this since no one sector has any economic dominance. Large scale recessions are evidence of public sector impositions on the economy, be it regulatory burdens or subsidies tying up resources in zombies.
Further, towns that have become
Free Market Booms
A common misconception is that a boom must always be sparked by credit expansion. However, this is not quite the case. While unstable credit expansion is the most common form to spark a boom, a boom can be nothing more than investors confusing rising prices with sustained rising demand. Booms have been caused by an increase in a commodity-based money, such as in 17th century Spain with a large influx of gold from the Americas, to booms sparked by unstable fads.
For a fun example of a localized boom-bust, I turnto a fad in the early 1990s, POGs. At the time, I was a middle school student. A few entrepreneurial kids began marketing up the various images as rare or common and a brisk market took off. More of my peers began saving up their allowance money to buy up bags of the things to try and sell to classmates to take advantage of the growing fad. Soon, the lunch period generated a rather brisk trade.
However, since everyone wanted in on the profits, everyone started buying bags of these cardboard disks. Everyone became a seller and no one was interested in being the buyer. Predictably, the market cratered. A few kids tried to unload entire bagfuls of these things for a few Dollars and biglosses but were eventually stuck with a product they didn’t want.
This POG craze was a classic Minsky Cycle. Yet, at no point in this was credit ever involved. No bank would hand a 12 year old kid a loan to buy bags of cardboard chips on expectation of turning them for a profit. This was a boom-bust financed purely by savings in a fairly strong example of a free market.
Where the fiat credit system causes problems, however, is it allows the boom to become significantly larger than it otherwise would have been. At the turn of the 21st century, housing was treated very much the same way as my middle school peers treated POGs. Buy with the expectation to flip to someone else for a profit in a shorttimeframe .
In a healthy, free market credit system, the boom would be muted since interest rates would increase as demand for funds to buy housing depleted the savings base. However, with a central bank in play, interest rates were continually suppressed artificially and new money and credit was created out of thin air, fueling the price increase. The longer the boom continued, the more it convinced less risk-averse investors to try their hand at flipping. Interest rate suppression continued to fuel ever increasing housing prices, pulling more and more people into the bubble, leading to a collapse more spectacular than a few middle school kids blowing a few weeks of allowance money. Had interest rates increased as demand for mortgages increased, people would have balked at 12% loans, causing the bubble to burst much earlier.
Of course, instead of learning our lesson, the government has gone right back to manipulating the housing market and prices are higher now than they were at the 2006 bubble peak.
A common misconception is that a boom must always be sparked by credit expansion. However, this is not quite the case. While unstable credit expansion is the most common form to spark a boom, a boom can be nothing more than investors confusing rising prices with sustained rising demand. Booms have been caused by an increase in a commodity-based money, such as in 17th century Spain with a large influx of gold from the Americas, to booms sparked by unstable fads.
For a fun example of a localized boom-bust, I turn
However, since everyone wanted in on the profits, everyone started buying bags of these cardboard disks. Everyone became a seller and no one was interested in being the buyer. Predictably, the market cratered. A few kids tried to unload entire bagfuls of these things for a few Dollars and big
This POG craze was a classic Minsky Cycle. Yet, at no point in this was credit ever involved. No bank would hand a 12 year old kid a loan to buy bags of cardboard chips on expectation of turning them for a profit. This was a boom-bust financed purely by savings in a fairly strong example of a free market.
Where the fiat credit system causes problems, however, is it allows the boom to become significantly larger than it otherwise would have been. At the turn of the 21st century, housing was treated very much the same way as my middle school peers treated POGs. Buy with the expectation to flip to someone else for a profit in a short
In a healthy, free market credit system, the boom would be muted since interest rates would increase as demand for funds to buy housing depleted the savings base. However, with a central bank in play, interest rates were continually suppressed artificially and new money and credit was created out of thin air, fueling the price increase. The longer the boom continued, the more it convinced less risk-averse investors to try their hand at flipping. Interest rate suppression continued to fuel ever increasing housing prices, pulling more and more people into the bubble, leading to a collapse more spectacular than a few middle school kids blowing a few weeks of allowance money. Had interest rates increased as demand for mortgages increased, people would have balked at 12% loans, causing the bubble to burst much earlier.
Of course, instead of learning our lesson, the government has gone right back to manipulating the housing market and prices are higher now than they were at the 2006 bubble peak.
Government Makes the Problem Worse
As noted above, a boom and bust is not necessarily a result of government intervention. However, what we now commonlyregard as recessions and depressions are almost always tied to government-caused credit expansion, and government intervention tends to make booms and busts significantly worse than they otherwise would have been. Government involvement can turn a recession, like the one that quickly resolved itself and was forgotten in 1920, to a full-on Great Depression, which didn’t truly resolve itself until after the Second World War.
Economies have ups and downs independent of government-caused business cycles. What is in demand today and how we build things today is not going to be the same in the future and this will inevitably lead to a decline as an economy changes its capital structure. People and plants can’t be retrained and converted to satisfythe newest demand instantly. In a free market, the impact tends to be muted, especially in a region with significant economic diversity, but not all economic fluctuations are tied to the now all-to -familiar business cycles the follow central-bank money creation.
As noted above, a boom and bust is not necessarily a result of government intervention. However, what we now commonly
Economies have ups and downs independent of government-caused business cycles. What is in demand today and how we build things today is not going to be the same in the future and this will inevitably lead to a decline as an economy changes its capital structure. People and plants can’t be retrained and converted to satisfy
- Source, Mises.org